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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW RELATING TO TRANSFERS
OF UNDERTAKINGS
AMANDINE GARDE∗
1. Introduction
Directive 77/187 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States
relating to the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of
undertakings1 is one of the most contentious directives in the sphere of social
policy. So far, the European Court of Justice has handed down 34 judgments
on this Directive alone (31 preliminary references and 3 direct actions) and the
Community legislature has already intervened twice to amend and consolidate
the Directive.2 This article focuses on the way the law has evolved since 1998.3
This article is divided into three main parts and considers both the inter-
pretation of the Directive by the Court and its amendment by the Community
legislature. The first part deals with the general evolution of the scope of
the Directive. The meaning of “transfer of an undertaking” has so far been
the question most subject to litigation. The Court has tried to strike a suit-
able balance between the need to protect employees’ rights on the transfer
of an undertaking and the need to ensure the competitiveness and economic
efficiency of undertakings. The second part of this article also deals with
the scope of the Directive. However, the focus is more specifically on the
relationship between the law of transfers and other areas of law: competition
law and public procurement, public law and insolvency law. Again, it will be
argued that the balance is difficult to find, and still often remains to be found.
Finally, the rights protected under the Directive and the remedies available
for its breach are addressed.
∗ Selwyn College, Cambridge. I would like to thank Professor Piet Eeckhout and Dr
Andrea Biondi for their comments.
1. Subsequently referred to as “the Directive”. O.J. 1977, L 61/26.
2. Directive 98/50, O.J. 1998, L 201/58, and Directive 2001/23, O.J. 2001, L 82/16.
3. For an account of the law as it stood in 1993 and in 1998, see De Groot, “The Council
Directive on the safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings:
an overview of the case law”, 30 CML Rev. (1993), 331 and “The Council Directive on the
safeguarding of employees’ rights in the event of transfers of undertakings: an overview of
recent case law”, 35 CML Rev. (1998), 707.
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2. The general scope of the Directive . . . yet again!
The Court has been interpreting Article 1(1) on the scope of the Directive and
dealing with the general question of whether the transfer of an undertaking
has taken place ever since 1986. The state of its case law was nevertheless
particularly unclear in 1997 after its decisions in the cases of Schmidt4 and
Su¨zen.5 A reminder is useful to understand the evolution of the Court’s case
law since then.
2.1. The Court’s case law up to 1997
In 1986, in Spijkers,6 the Court gave its first ruling on the meaning of “the
transfer of an undertaking”. The decisive criterion is whether there is “an eco-
nomic entity that retains its identity”. An overall assessment is required: all
the circumstances characterizing the transaction must be taken into account
and no factor is decisive on its own. The Court insisted that national courts
should make the necessary factual appraisal in the light of the interpretation
criteria it had set out. Nevertheless, as the Court had not given a clear defin-
ition of “the transfer of an undertaking”, national courts felt uncertain and
referred more and more cases asking detailed questions of facts. Moreover,
the question arose as to whether atypical forms of transfers such as contracting
out should fall within the scope of the Directive.
The Court changed its approach in 1994, in Schmidt, and ruled not on
whether the Directive was applicable, but on whether the Directive was to
be applied to the specific case referred to it. In this case, the Court did
not follow its usual “shopping list approach”7 as in previous cases but held
instead that the similarity of the activity was conclusive. It is surprising that
the Court gave an overriding priority to the similarity of activity in assessing
whether a transfer had taken place, whereas it had stressed in Spijkers that no
factor was decisive on its own. Schmidt has been strongly criticized in several
Member States, in particular in Germany and France,8 where it was thought
4. Case C-392/92, Schmidt, [1994] ECR I-2435.
5. Case C-13/95, Su¨zen, [1997] ECR I-1259.
6. Case 24/85, Spijkers, [1986] ECR 1119.
7. McMullen, “Contracting out and market testing – The uncertainty ends?”, 23 ILJ (1994),
230.
8. In France, for example, the Cour de cassation clearly refused to apply the Schmidt ruling
in the later case of Sonevie (Ch. Soc., 13 Dec. 1995). See also academic writings: Waquet,
“L’application par le juge franc¸ais de la directive communautaire du 14 fe´vrier 1977”, Droit
Social (1995) 1007; Pochet, “L’apport de l’arreˆt Schmidt a` la de´finition du transfert d’une entite´
e´conomique”, Droit Social (1994) 931; De´prez, “La notion de transfert d’entreprise au sens
de la directive europe´enne du 14 fe´vrier 1977 et de l’article L.122-12 al. 2 du code du travail:
jurisprudence franc¸aise et communautaire”, RJS (1995) 314.
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that it would have counterproductive results by putting too heavy a burden on
employers.
These pressures prompted the Court to review its position in Su¨zen. The
Full Court held that there could be no transfer of an undertaking if neither
significant assets nor a major part of the workforce, in terms of their number
and skills, had been transferred. The similarity of activity is not sufficient
for the Directive to apply. The judgment of the Court in Su¨zen was well
received in Member States such as France.9 Nevertheless, it gives rise to
several objections. Firstly, the requirement of the transfer of assets is arbitrary
from the employees’ point of view.10 Moreover, the assets test is one which,
in the context of the contracting out of services, offers the transferor and
the transferee some scope for structuring their agreements so as to avoid the
impact of the Directive.11 Furthermore, the requirement that the taking over of
the workforce must be assessed quantitatively (“in terms of their number. . .”),
as well as qualitatively (“. . . and skills”), is also difficult to support. Indeed, it
gives the transferee a good incentive not to employ the transferor’s employees,
even in situations where he could have employed some of them. Such a result
is paradoxical, since it militates against the protection of employees’ rights
that the Directive purports to achieve. Finally, the Court referred to its previous
case law as if it intended to clarify it, but failed to do so. In particular, the
Court relied on Schmidt in paragraph 8 (the similarity of activity is sufficient)
while adopting a contrary reasoning from paragraphs 9 to 16 (either assets
or employees must transfer). A distinction on the facts was most unlikely,
as confirmed by the Court itself in Hernandez Vidal.12 It is true that the
question of contracting out is difficult. This is especially so as this question
had not been tackled by the Community legislature (presumably because of
the disagreement between Member States). However, if Community law is to
be effective, why would the Court rely on cases that may no longer be good
law?13
9. Case of MGEN, Cour de cassation (Ch.Soc., 7 July 1998), where the Cour de cassation
used the exact words of the Court in Su¨zen.
10. Davies, “Taken to the cleaners? Contracting out of services yet again”, 26 ILJ (1997),
193, at 196 (“if workers are needed to tip the same dustbins as before the transfer but into
refuse vehicles the transferee had lying around unused, that will count against the Directive
applying; whereas if the transferee had taken over the transferor’s vehicles, that will bring the
Directive into play”).
11. This is reinforced by the fact that the Court, contrary to what it had done in previous
cases, required that the assets transferred be “significant”.
12. Joined Cases C-127/96, C-229/96 & C-74/97, Hernandez Vidal, [1998] ECR I-8179.
13. There is some disagreement as to whether Schmidt has been overruled by Su¨zen. For
an alternative explanation of the scope of the Schmidt ruling, see e.g. McMullen, “Atypical
transfers, atypical workers and atypical employment structures – A case for greater transparency
in transfer of employment issues”, 25 ILJ (1996), 286. The fact that the debate on what
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2.2. The amendment of the Directive
That was the state of confusion in which the Court’s case law stood in 1997.
One year later, the Community legislature finally amended Article 1(1) of the
Directive. Sub-paragraph (b) was added in an attempt to define the phrase
“transfer of an undertaking”: “there is a transfer within the meaning of this
Directive where there is the transfer of an economic entity which retains its
identity, meaning an organized grouping of resources which has the objective
of pursuing an economic activity”. It is remarkable how similar this wording
is to that used by the Court in Su¨zen. By stressing that an economic activity
was not enough to constitute an undertaking, the legislature probably intended
to reduce the discretion of the Court in defining the transfer of an undertaking
while at the same time endeavouring to accommodate Member States such
as France and Germany. Not surprisingly, this legislative intervention did
not help to clarify what could constitute “the transfer of an undertaking”, as
testified by the refusal of several national courts to withdraw their requests
for preliminary rulings from the Court’s register despite its invitation to do so.
However, the aim of the amendment as stated in the Preamble was precisely
guided by the fact that “considerations of legal security and transparency
required that the legal concept of transfer be clarified in the light of the case
law of the Court. Such clarification has not altered the scope of [the Directive]
as interpreted by the Court of Justice”.14 It is interesting to note that confusion
in the case law of the Court is acknowledged but at the same time that the
new version of the Directive implements the case law of the Court on the
interpretation of its scope.
Before turning to the Court’s case law since 1997, it is worth mentioning at
this stage that the scope of the Directive has been amended in another respect.
It is true that the Community legislature decided not to lay down a Community
definition of employee. Article 2(1)(d) clearly states that “’employee’ shall
mean any person who, in the Member State concerned, is protected as an
employee under national employment law”.15 This follows the trend adopted
by the Court in its early cases.16 However, Article 2(2) has been added:
“Member States shall not exclude from the scope of the Directive contracts
of employment or employment relationships solely because:
(a) of the number of working hours performed or to be performed,
constitutes the transfer of an undertaking is still ongoing emphasizes the lack of clarity of the
Court’s case law in this respect.
14. Recital 8 of the Preamble.
15. The same is true of the definitions of “employment representatives” (Art. 2(1)(c)),
“contract of employment” and “employment relationship” (Art. 2(2)).
16. Case 105/84, Mikkelsen, [1985] ECR 2639 and Case 19/83, Wendelboe, [1985] ECR
457.
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(b) they are in employment relationships governed by a fixed-duration
contract of employment . . . , or
(c) they are temporary employment relationships . . . .”
This new provision makes clear that part-time and other atypical workers
cannot be discriminated against by being excluded from the scope of the
Directive: they benefit from the same rights under the Directive as full-time
employees, irrespective of what national law may provide in their respect.17
The lack of a Community-wide definition of employee has been criticized
as having “frustrated the aims of those who drafted the Directive”.18 Indeed,
there is a wide variation in the coverage ratione personae of the implementing
laws of the Directive in the Member States, which may ultimately distort
competition, while discriminating against different categories of workers. For
instance, it will appear further below that in some Member States employees
in the public sector cannot benefit from the protection of the Directive. New
Article 2(2) should reduce this variation and consequently is a welcome
addition from the point of view of employees’ rights. However, it does not
replace a Community-wide definition of the term “employee”, which would
have been a better option. The refusal to define such crucial terms for the
application of the Directive at Community level is one of the drawbacks of
the approach used by the Community to harmonize labour standards. It may
deprive some workers (who arguably need it most) of the protection that the
Directive provides.
2.3. Labour intensive sectors of activity
The Court dealt with five cases in two judgments of 12 December 1998:
Hernandez Vidal19 and Sanchez Hidalgo.20 The facts of these cases are very
similar, for they all dealt with the transfer of economic activities and employ-
ees without the transfer of any assets. Sanchez Hidalgo concerned the con-
tracting out of home help services and the contracting out of surveillance
services at a medical supply depot. In Hernandez Vidal, the Court had to
consider the contracting-in of three cleaning contracts, i.e. the transfer of an
ancillary activity from an outside contractor to the main employer. It was the
17. This is consistent with the requirements of the Community Charter of the Fundamental
Social Rights of Workers of 9 Dec. 1989, which is expressly referred to in Recital 9 of the
Preamble of the Directive.
18. Hepple, “Report for the Commission of the European Communities Directorate-General
Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs – Main shortcomings and proposals for
revision of Council Directive 77/187/EEC”, December 1990.
19. Hernandez Vidal, cited supra note 12.
20. Joined Cases C-173/96 & 247/96, Sanchez Hidalgo, [1998] ECR I-8237.
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first time that the Court had to deal with contracting-in. Indeed, in its previ-
ous cases, it had rather considered contracting-out situations, i.e. the transfer
from an employer to an outside contractor of an ancillary activity. The Court
held that contracting-in situations should in principle fall within the scope of
the Directive in the same way as contracting-out scenarios. This statement is
perfectly consistent with both the letter of the Directive (Art. 1(1) does not
distinguish contracting-in and contracting-out) and its purpose (the main aim
of the Directive is indeed to ensure, as far as possible, that employees’ rights
are protected in the event of the transfer of an undertaking).
In Hernandez Vidal and Sanchez Hidalgo, the Court placed a heavy reliance
on Su¨zen. Its reasoning can be divided into two main parts. In the first stage of
its reasoning, the Court defined the term entity as referring to “an organized
grouping of persons and assets facilitating the exercise of an economic activity
which pursues a specific objective”. Whilst such an entity must be sufficiently
structured and autonomous, it will not necessarily have significant assets: in
certain sectors, assets are often reduced to their most basic and the activity is
essentially based on manpower. Thus, an organized grouping of wage earners
who are specifically and permanently assigned to a common task may, despite
the absence of other factors of production, amount to an economic entity. In
the second stage of its reasoning, the Court considered whether the economic
entity had been transferred. It held, as it did in Su¨zen, that such a transfer
can only take place if the new employer does not merely pursue the activity
in question but also takes over a major part, in terms of their number and
skills, of the employees assigned by his predecessor to that task. The Court
emphasized that it was for the referring court to decide both questions, thus
reverting to its initial approach in Spijkers.
The Court repeated that Spijkers formed the basis of its case law. However,
it made clear that the issue of what constitutes the transfer of an undertaking
must be divided into two clearly identified sub-questions. This seems logical
to decide firstly whether there is an economic entity and only then whether
the entity has been transferred. Such an analysis is more rigorous than that
adopted in Spijkers, Schmidt or Su¨zen and should help restore the confidence
of national courts in the reasoning of the Court on the scope of the Directive. It
is noticeable that Advocates General Van Gerven and La Pergola had already
suggested in Redmond Stichting21 and Su¨zen respectively that the transfer
of an undertaking was something more than the transfer of its activity. In
particular, Advocate General Van Gerven spoke of an “organizational unit”,
which underlines that the entity transferred must have a certain degree of
independence. This idea is quite similar to the definition he proposed of an
economic entity in his Opinion in Schmidt and which the Court refused to
21. Case C-29/91, Redmond Stichting, [1992] ECR I-3189.
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follow. Nevertheless, it now seems clear that an economic entity cannot be
reduced to the activity entrusted to it. Schmidt has not been relied upon or
even quoted by the Court in Hernandez Vidal or in Sanchez Hidalgo, which
seems to confirm that it has been implicitly overruled.
Moreover, the Court reaffirmed that a distinction should be drawn between
labour intensive and other sectors of activity. In labour intensive sectors, it is
legitimate to rely heavily on whether a major part of the workforce is taken
over. The rationale is that it is necessary to give some protection to employees
notwithstanding the sector of activity they work in. If there are no assets,
employees cannot be automatically deprived of any protection; other factors
must also be considered.
In these two respects, the Court has successfully clarified its case law in
attempting to strike the proper balance between the need to protect employees
on transfer and the need to ensure that undertakings are competitive, which
should ultimately benefit the workforce. Nevertheless, two important ques-
tions still remained at this stage to be dealt with by the Court. The first one
concerned the respective importance of the transfer of assets and the transfer
of the workforce. The second one was the possibility offered to subsequent
employers to avoid the scope of the Directive, which has been mentioned
above. The decision of the Court in Oy Liikenne22 has partly addressed these
concerns.
2.4. Other sectors of activity and remaining problems
Following a tender procedure, YTV awarded the operation of seven local
bus routes, previously operated by Hakunilan Liikenne, to Oy Liikenne for
three years. Hakunilan Liikenne dismissed 45 drivers, 33 of whom (all those
who applied) were re-engaged by Oy Liikenne. Oy Liikenne also engaged 18
other drivers. The former Hakunilan Liikenne drivers were re-engaged on the
conditions laid down by the national collective agreement in the sector, which
are less favourable overall than those which applied in Hakunilan Liikenne.
Two of them claimed that there was a transfer under the Directive and that
they should have been re-engaged under the same working conditions as they
previously enjoyed. No vehicles or assets connected with the operation of the
bus routes concerned were transferred. Oy Liikenne merely leased two buses
from Hakunilan Liikenne for two or three months while waiting for the 22 new
buses it had ordered to be delivered, and bought from Hakunilan Liikenne the
uniforms of some of the drivers who had entered its service. Again, one of the
questions the Court had to answer was whether the Directive was applicable.
22. Case C-172/99, Oy Liikenne, [2001] ECR I-745.
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The sector of bus transport is obviously not labour intensive, as it requires
substantial plant and equipment. The Court held that in an industry neces-
sarily dependent on assets, as in this case, the transfer of the majority of the
workforce alone could not trigger the application of the Directive. In such
sectors, “where the tangible assets contribute significantly to the perform-
ance of the activity, the absence of a transfer to a significant extent from the
old to the new contractor of such assets, which are necessary for the proper
functioning of the entity, must lead to the conclusion that the entity does not
retain its identity”. The type of undertaking or business concerned is relevant
in assessing whether a transfer has occurred.
It seems that the Court has introduced a hierarchy between the two factors
– the transfer of assets and the transfer of the workforce – mentioned in Su¨zen
to decide whether a transfer is within the scope of the Directive. For the
Court, the criterion of whether the major part of the workforce is taken over
is supplementary: it is only if an undertaking can function without any assets
that the transfer of a major part of the workforce is crucial in assessing whether
the Directive applies. Another interpretation would have been to hold that the
transfer of the workforce is as important as the transfer of assets. If such had
been the case and if the majority of the workforce had been taken over, as in
Oy Liikenne, then a transfer could not have been ruled out in principle. The
national court would have had to weigh all the facts to reach a conclusion.
In Oy Liikenne, however, the Court clearly rejected this interpretation. The
absence of the transfer of assets in non-labour intensive sectors of activity is
sufficient to exclude the transfer from the scope of the Directive. The Court
has thus narrowed down the scope of the Directive and distanced itself even
further from its extensive ruling in Schmidt.
The Court has not directly dealt with the second issue that remained after
Sanchez Hidalgo and Hernandez Vidal relating to the extent to which sub-
sequent employers can avoid the scope of the Directive by refusing to take on
the majority of the workforce when they could do so. However, the decision
of the Court in Oy Liikenne should reduce the ambit of the problem.
As stated above, the test laid down in Su¨zen makes it possible for two
subsequent employers to avoid the mandatory provisions of the Directive.
The risk of such collusion between transferors and transferees has caused
enormous concern in some Member States, and in the United Kingdom in
particular.23 In ECM v. Fox most notably,24 the Court of Appeal held that
where a contractor refuses to take on employees, an employment tribunal
23. For a fuller account on this case law, see McMullen, “TUPE – Sidestepping Su¨zen”,
28 ILJ (1999) 360 and East, “Transfers and tribulations: ECM v. Cox and the difficulties of
applying the Acquired Rights Directive and the TUPE Regulations to the contracting out of
services”, (2000) ECLR, 170.
24. Decision of the E.A.T. [1998] ICR 631 upheld by the C.A. [1999] ICR 1162.
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could look at the motive of the contractor in deciding whether the Directive
should apply. If the aim is to avoid its mandatory provisions, the tribunal can
decide that there is in fact a transfer. This reasoning illustrates how difficult
the application of the Su¨zen test may be in practice.
It is true that this problem has lost some of its importance since the judg-
ment of the Court in Oy Liikenne: the reason employers have for refusing to
take on employees is now relevant only in cases where assets are not trans-
ferred. If, firstly, there is a hierarchy in the criteria used by the Court to decide
that a transfer falls within the scope of the Directive and if, secondly, signi-
ficant assets are not taken over, then there can be no transfer at all. There is
consequently no need to enquire into the motive of employers. Conversely, if
assets are taken over, the Directive will probably apply and employees should
keep their employment. In this respect, the Court has limited the risk in Oy
Liikenne that two consecutive employers voluntarily set aside the application
of the Directive and thus avoid its mandatory provisions.
By way of contrast, the difficulty remains for labour intensive sectors where
no assets are required and where the taking over of the workforce is crucial
in deciding whether a transfer falls within the scope of the Directive.25 The
decision of the English Court of Appeal in Adi (UK) Ltd v. Willer and others,
concerned with the transfer of security services,26 shows that the problem is
still bound to come up. The Court of Appeal upheld its decision in ECM: “if
the circumstances of an alleged transfer of an undertaking are such that an
actual transfer of labour would be a relevant factor to be taken into account
in deciding whether there has been a [transfer within the meaning of the
Directive], an employment tribunal is obliged to consider the reason why the
labour was not transferred”. Consequently, “if the economic entity is labour
intensive such that, applying Su¨zen, there is no transfer if the workforce is
not taken on, but there would be if they were, the tribunal is obliged to treat
the case as if the labour had transferred if it is established that the reason
or the principal reason for this was in order to avoid the application of [the
Directive]”.
However, it may be argued that the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in ECM
is flawed. In Adi, Lord Justice Simon Brown dissented because he thought it
was impossible to reconcile ECM with the rulings of the Court. Indeed, as
stated above, the Court’s case law clearly requires in the first place that there
is an economic entity and in the second place that this entity is transferred.
If the tribunal can decide on its own motion that there is a transfer even if
the major part of the workforce is not taken over, then the second stage of
the enquiry is simply ignored and the decision as to whether a transfer within
25. Davies, “Transfers – The UK will have to make up its own mind”, 30 ILJ (2001), 231.
26. Decision of the Court of Appeal [2001] IRLR 542.
532 Garde CML Rev. 2002
the scope of the Directive has taken place is reduced to an enquiry into the
existence of an economic entity. On the other hand, it could be argued that
the Directive leaves some degree of freedom to employers in structuring their
deal to decide whether or not the Directive should apply. However, this seems
to run against the idea that the provisions of the Directive are mandatory,
as well as against the protective purpose of the Directive. It is hoped that a
national court will soon refer a question to the Court so that it grasps the
nettle.
It will be noted as a last remark on Oy Liikenne that the Court has solved
– again – the case on its specific facts. Even more remarkably, the Court
has claimed on the one hand that the assessment of the facts should be left
to national courts, while on the other hand expressly deciding how the facts
should be assessed in the case. National courts should be entrusted with the
application to particular cases of the criteria laid down by the Court. Very
detailed considerations of the facts by the Court do not necessarily enhance
the proper understanding of the law, as the confusion that followed cases such
as Schmidt and Su¨zen illustrates. Moreover, the Court should use its precious
resources to consider questions of principle, rather than questions of facts.27
2.5. Subcontracting
Until recently, the Court had not dealt with the issue of subcontracting. It has
just done so in Temco.28 In this case, Volkswagen entrusted the cleaning of
a number of its production plants to BMV, which subcontracted the cleaning
work to its subsidiary GMC. Volkswagen subsequently terminated its con-
tract with BMV and instructed Temco to provide the same services. GMC
dismissed most of its staff, part of which were re-engaged by Temco.
Two questions on the applicability of the Directive were referred to the
Court. Firstly, the Cour du Travail de Bruxelles asked whether an undertaking
had been transferred within the meaning of Su¨zen as subsequently refined.
Secondly, the Cour du Travail expressed doubts as to whether the Directive
could apply, as it requires “a legal transfer or merger” and GMC never had a
contractual relationship with Volkswagen.
The Court’s answer to the first question is not particularly surprising. It
relied on its previous cases and ruled that a transfer was within the scope
of the Directive provided that the employees taken over were an essential
part, in terms of their number and skills, of the employees assigned by the
subcontractor to the performance of the subcontract.
27. More generally on the relationship between the Court and national courts, see the
Opinion of A.G. Jacobs in Case C-338/95, Wiener, [1997] ECR I-6495.
28. Case C-51/00, Temco, judgment of 24 Jan. 2002, nyr.
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As regards the second question, the Court had already decided on several
occasions that the absence of a direct contractual link between the transferor
and transferee could not as such preclude a transfer within the meaning of
the Directive.29 The facts of Su¨zen illustrate what a triangular situation is:
A entered into a cleaning contract first with B and then with C. The Court
held that, even if there was no direct contractual link between B and C,
there was “a legal transfer or merger” within the meaning of the Directive.
The primary purpose of the Directive to protect employees’ rights and the
uncertainties resulting from the comparison of the different language versions
of the Directive justify that the concept of “a legal transfer or merger” should
cover a broad range of situations.30 In Temco, however, the issue was slightly
more complicated as there were not three but four employers involved –
Volkswagen, BMV, GMC and Temco. The Court took the reasoning it had
adopted in its previous cases one step further: “the fact that the transferor
undertaking is not the one which concluded the first contract with the original
contractor but only the subcontractor of the original co-contractor has no
effect on the concept of legal transfer since it is sufficient for that transfer
to be part of the web of contractual relations even if they are indirect”
(emphasis added). Subcontracts create links between the contractor and the
subcontractor, “which may be legal, as in the case of direct payment, and
which are in any event practical links, as in the case of the monitoring and
daily supervision of the work done”. Such links are sufficient to characterize
“a legal transfer or merger”.
The Court did not follow the Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed who
submitted that subcontracting was of such a nature that it should not fall
at all within the scope of the Directive. He argued that the economic cir-
cumstances surrounding the subcontracting of services should be specifically
taken into account in assessing whether the Directive should be applicable.
The subcontracting of services is characterized by the mobility of the work-
29. In Temco, the Court quoted Case 324/86, Daddy’s Dance Hall, [1988] ECR 739; Red-
mond Stichting, supra note 21; Joined Cases C-171 & 172/94, Merckx and Neuhuys, [1996]
ECR I-1253; Case C-13/95, Su¨zen, [1997] ECR I-1259.
30. The Court has sometimes been severely criticized for taking such a broad view of what
“a legal transfer or merger” should cover. For a recent example, see the comments of Lord
Justice May in Adi (UK) Ltd v. Willer and others [2001] IRLR 542 (Court of Appeal): “It is
clear that the state of the European . . . authorities is unsatisfactory. The concept of transfer is
now a judicially constructed fiction derived from the purpose of the Directive . . . to safeguard
the rights of employees. The requirement in Article 1 of the Directive for the transfer to result
from ’a legal transfer or merger’ has been emasculated out of existence by purposive judicial
interpretation. The literal words, and indeed the whole structure, of the Directive appear to
require some legal relationship effecting a transfer between the transferor employer and the
transferee employer, such as might take place upon the assignment of an undertaking or the
sale of a business. But the cases have eliminated the need to look for such an orthodox legal
relationship, resulting in confusion and uncertainty.”
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force and the requirement to keep the market very flexible. If the Directive
was applicable, its objective to protect employees’ rights would be given a
disproportionate priority over freedom of contract, which would in turn affect
the competitiveness of undertakings.
It is submitted that the argument based on the competitiveness of undertak-
ings is not convincing, all the more so as the Court has attempted on several
occasions to strike a proper balance between the need to protect employees’
rights and the need to ensure competitiveness. Firstly, it held in Rygaard
that a one-off contract could not fall within the scope of the Directive, as it
requires the transfer of a stable economic entity whose activity is not limited
to performing one specific works contract.31 Secondly, as shown above, the
Court has narrowed down the test of whether a transfer of an undertaking has
taken place in Su¨zen and subsequent cases precisely to take account of the
need to safeguard the competitiveness of undertakings. Finally, the Court has
acknowledged that other considerations may have to be given a priority over
the protection of employees’ rights in specific areas such as insolvency so
that economic realities may be reflected.32
More fundamentally, the approach put forward by the Advocate Gener-
al seems to be at odds with the primary purpose of the Directive. Indeed,
subcontracted employees generally work under precarious employment con-
ditions. That is why they need, more than any other employee, to enjoy the
protection provided for by the Directive.33 Furthermore, excluding subcon-
tracting as a whole from the scope of the Directive would give employers an
incentive to resort as often as possible to this cheap, but precarious, method
of employment.
3. The relationship of the Directive with other areas of law
3.1. Refusal by the Court to hold that the scope of the Directive could be
restricted by competition law or public procurement law
3.1.1. The Directive and Article 81
In Allen,34 the Court was faced for the first time with the applicability of the
Directive to undertakings belonging to the same corporate group and, thus,
with the relationship between the Directive and Article 81 EC.
ACC and AMS are two wholly owned subsidiaries of the AMCO Group,
both involved in driveage work for coal mine owners. In 1994 and 1995,
31. Case C-48/94, Rygaard, [1995] ECR I-2745.
32. See below for a more detailed discussion.
33. See McMullen, op. cit. supra note 13.
34. Case C-234/98, Allen, [1999] ECR I-8643.
Transfers of undertakings 535
ACC submitted a bid to carry out further driveage work for RJB and won
it. However, its terms were that the work would be subcontracted to AMS,
AMS having lower labour costs than ACC. ACC dismissed 24 workers,
including Mr Allen, who were subsequently employed by AMS, but under
less favourable terms of employment. These workers showed no enthusiasm
whatsoever. ACC consequently decided not to subcontract further work to
AMS and re-engaged the 24 workers. Their working conditions were better
than with AMS but worse than they originally were. The workers claimed
they were entitled in accordance with the Directive to their original conditions
of employment.
The Leeds Industrial Tribunal asked whether the Directive could apply to
two companies belonging to the same corporate group and having common
ownership, management, premises and work or whether such companies were
a single undertaking for the purpose of the Directive.
The Court upheld the line of reasoning of Mr Allen and the other applicants.
The purpose of the Directive is to ensure as far as possible that the rights of
employees are safeguarded in the event of a change of employer. According
to the case law of the Court, the Directive is applicable regardless of whether
or not the ownership of the undertaking is transferred.35 This interpretation
is supported by Article 2 of the Directive which defines a transferor and a
transferee without making any reference to undertakings belonging to the
same corporate group.36 Since subsidiaries are distinct legal entities, each
with specific employment relationships with their employees, the Directive
can apply to a transfer between two of them notwithstanding that they belong
to a single group.37
Contrary to what ACC suggested, the ruling of the Court in Viho38 does
not make any difference in this respect. Viho concerned a distribution agree-
ment between two firms belonging to the same group. The Court of First
Instance held that the Commission correctly classified this corporate group as
one economic unit within which the subsidiaries do not enjoy real autonomy
in determining their course of action in the market. The Court upheld this
reasoning and held that Article 81 was not applicable.39 “[F]or the purpose
35. Case 287/86, Ny Molle Kro, [1987] ECR 5465 and Daddy’s Dance Hall, supra note 29.
36. A transferor, or respectively a transferee, is “any natural or legal person who, by reason
of a transfer within the meaning of Art. 1 ceases to be, or respectively becomes, the employer
in respect of the undertaking”.
37. The fact that the companies in question not only have the same ownership but also the
same management and the same premises and that they are engaged in the same works does
not affect the outcome of the case.
38. Case C-73/95 P, Viho, [1996] ECR I-5457. Appeal against judgment of the CFI in Case
T-102/92, [1995] ECR II-17.
39. The group’s policy, however, could fall under Art. 82 (ex 86) EC if the conditions for
its application were fulfilled.
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of the application of the competition rules, the unified conduct on the market
of the parent company and its subsidiaries takes precedence over the formal
separation between those companies as a result of their separate legal person-
alities” (emphasis added).40 In contrast, the main purpose of the Directive is
to protect the rights of employees in case of transfers. Firstly, the Directive
is part of the Community’s Social Action Programme. Secondly, both its title
and its Preamble stress its social purpose.41 Thirdly, the Court has always
emphasized its social objective,42 and it stated in Allen itself that the aim of
the Directive is “to ensure, so far as possible, that the rights of employees are
safeguarded in the event of a change of employer by allowing them to remain
in employment with the new employer on the terms and conditions agreed
with the transferor”. Thus, the focus in interpreting the Directive should be
the effect of the transfer on the employees of the undertaking, which is likely
to be identical whether the transfer takes place between subsidiaries of the
same corporate group or not.43 That is why the purported analogy put forward
by ACC could only have supported the applicant’s line of reasoning.
3.1.2. The Directive and Directive 92/50
In Oy Liikenne44 the Court adopted a similar approach when faced with
the relationship between the Directive and Directive 92/50 relating to the
co-ordination of procedures for the award of public service contracts.45
Directive 92/50 is intended, as the 20th Recital in its Preamble states, to
eliminate practices which are an obstacle to competition between service-
providers and to participation in the markets of other Member States. In order
to achieve this aim, Directive 92/50 requires the implementation of uniformly
applicable rules throughout the Community by all economic entities.
40. The problem with the approach of the Court in Viho, however, is that it gives an
absolute territorial protection to large corporate structures that can afford to have subsidiaries
across Europe. This arguably discriminates against smaller firms that do not have the financial
resources to establish integrated distribution systems and thus have to rely on independent
distributors. See Groupe de socie´te´s, (1997) Journal du Droit International, 596. Nevertheless,
it is true that “it is not for the Court, on the pretext that certain conduct, such as that to which the
applicant objects, may fall outside the competition rules, to apply Art. [81] to circumstances
for which it is not intended in order to fill a gap which may exist in the system of regulation
laid down in the Treaty” (Case T-102/92, cited supra note 38).
41. “Whereas it is necessary to provide for the protection of employees in the event of a
change of employer, in particular to ensure that their rights are safeguarded”. The amended
version of the Directive also refers to the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights
of Workers of 9 Dec. 1989 (recital 9 of the Preamble).
42. Most of the cases on the Directive illustrate this point.
43. This is particularly true in cases such as Allen where the employment conditions are
different with the two consecutive employers.
44. Oy Liikenne, supra note 22.
45. O.J. 1992, L 61/26.
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In this case, Directive 92/50 was applicable, as Oy Liikenne was awarded
the contract for the operation of seven local bus routes after a tender procedure
by the YTV, a public authority under Article 1(b). The Korkein oikeus noted
in its order for reference that the application of the Directive in such a context,
while protecting the rights of employees, might obstruct competition between
undertakings and prejudice the aim of effectiveness pursued by Directive
92/50. This raised the question of the interrelationship of the two directives.
The Court repeated that the Directive primarily aimed at protecting employ-
ees’ rights in the event of the transfer of an undertaking. To ensure this pro-
tection, the Court held that the applicability of the Directive could not be
excluded simply by the fact that the contract in question was awarded follow-
ing a public procurement procedure conducted in accordance with Directive
92/50. The Court noted that the Directive does not provide any such exception
to its scope. Nor does Directive 92/50 contain any provision to that effect. The
literal interpretation of the two directives in question thus confirms the Court’s
findings based on the purposive approach to the Directive. Consequently, even
if a transaction comes under Directive 92/50, this does not of itself rule out
the application of the Directive.46
Oy Liikenne submitted that the application of the Directive to awards of
road transport services would cause serious problems of legal certainty, as the
successful undertaking would have to take on obligations it had no previous
knowledge of. Not surprisingly, the Court rejected this argument. As Advocate
General Le´ger stated, “the aim of Directive 92/50 is not to permit the take-
over of economic entities to the detriment of the rights of their workforce
but to place those service providers who wish to compete for the award of
a contract in equal competitive conditions”. Directive 92/50 is therefore not
intended to exempt contracting authorities and service-providers who offer
their services for the contracts in question from all the laws and regulations
applicable to the activities at stake, so that offers can be made without any
constraints. Operators retain their room to manoeuvre and compete with one
another by submitting different bids within an existing legal framework. Even
further, contracting authorities have an obligation to inform tenderers of all
conditions relating to the performance of a contract, so that tenderers can
take them into account when preparing their tenders. Consequently, service-
providers know that if they take over an economic entity that has retained
its identity, an undertaking will have been transferred within the meaning of
the Directive. If such is the case, they will reflect this information in their
costing assumptions before fixing the level of their offer. The two directives
can therefore be reconciled by reason of their objectives.
46. The Court also referred to the case law of the EFTA Court in Case E-2/95, Eidesund,
[1996] IRLR 684 and Case E-3/96, Ask, O.J.1997, C 136/7.
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The Commission has welcomed the decision of the Court in Oy Liikenne in
its recent “interpretative Communication on the Community law applicable to
public procurement and the possibilities for integrating social considerations
into public procurement”.47 It is true that the public procurement directives
currently in force contain little provision on the pursuit of social policy goals
within the framework of public procurement procedures. Nevertheless, they
permit the exclusion of a tenderer who “has not fulfilled obligations relating
to the payment of social security contributions . . . ” or who “has been guilty
of grave professional misconduct . . . ”. Furthermore, the Commission argues
that even if social criteria are not included among the various criteria given as
examples in the public procurement directives, the term “social criterion” may
be construed “as a criterion that makes it possible to evaluate, for example, the
quality of a service intended for a given category of disadvantaged persons
and may legitimately be used if it assists in the choice of the most econom-
ically advantageous tender within the meaning of the public procurement
directives”. This supports the view of the Court that the two directives are not
mutually exclusive by reason of their objectives.
3.2. Acceptance by the Court that the scope of the Directive may sometimes
be limited
While the Court has refused to narrow the scope of the Directive in Allen and
Oy Liikenne, it has accepted that it may be necessary to take into account either
the specificity of some activities or the risk that it may be counterproductive
to apply the Directive in given circumstances.
3.2.1. The Directive and public undertakings
The amendment of the Directive. Directive 98/50 added a new Article 1(1)(c)
to the Directive: “this Directive shall apply to public and private undertakings
engaged in economic activities whether or not they are operating for gain.
An administrative reorganization of public administrative authorities, or the
transfer of administrative functions between public administrative authorities,
is not a transfer within the meaning of the Directive”. This new article clearly
implements the case law of the Court. Firstly, the Court held in Redmond
Stichting48 that it is not necessary that an undertaking operate for gain to fall
within the scope of the Directive. In the same case, the Court also established
that its interpretation of the Directive applies to both public and private under-
takings irrespectively, which was recently confirmed in Sanchez Hidalgo49
47. COM (2001) 566 final.
48. Redmond Stichting, cited supra note 21.
49. Sanchez Hidalgo, cited supra note 20.
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where the city of Guadalajara and the German army were involved. Finally,
the Court limited the application of the Directive in Henke: the reorganization
of public administrative authorities does not come within the scope of the
Directive.50
This last point deserves further attention. It will be recalled that Henke
raised the question of whether a municipality was capable of constituting
an undertaking within the meaning of the Directive.51 The Court relied on
the First Recital of the Preamble of the Directive and its different language
versions to decide that the activities of a municipality were not of an economic
nature and could not therefore fall within the scope of the Directive. The
Court thus refused to follow the Opinion of Advocate General Lenz who
had suggested that the Court should decide the case on the basis of the
primary purpose of the Directive – the protection of the rights and interests
of employees.52 The Court did not adopt the purposive interpretation that it
has generally used in the context of transfers of undertakings.53 Moreover,
the Court did not sufficiently analyse the implications of its judgment. In
particular, the Court did not refer at all to the point made by Advocate General
Lenz that in some cases it may be extremely difficult to know in which capacity
public authorities act, for example in the case of the privatization of prisons.
The Advocate General pointed out that the criterion of activity in the exercise
of public powers is very difficult to pin down, since it is subject to change.
“What is today regarded as purely public may, even in a near future, be
carried out by a private undertaking with a view to profit. Furthermore,
it may be that functions carried out by a private undertaking are later on
regarded as being, again, functions of the public authorities. It is therefore
scarcely possible to justify the employees carrying out these activities
being covered at one time by the protection of the directive and then,
following a change of view as to the public character of their activities,
no longer enjoying that protection.”
This is reinforced by the fact that there may be a possible margin of inter-
pretation between what can be termed public administration and economic
activities. Finally, the Court did not sufficiently deal in Henke with what
should happen to employees in case all of a local authority’s functions –
both administrative and economic – are transferred to a new body, as what
was actually transferred did not clearly appear either in the judgment of the
Court or in the Opinion of Advocate General Lenz. The Court merely said
50. Case C-268/94, Henke, [1996] ECR I-4989.
51. De Groot, op. cit. (1998) supra note 3.
52. So did A.G. Van Gerven in Redmond Stichting, cited supra note 21.
53. This is why it has been argued that the Court has narrowed down the scope of the
Directive by introducing other tests than the employment tests that it had applied up to 1994:
Sargeant, “New doubts about transfers in the public sector”, 26 ILJ (1997) 265.
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that “even if it is assumed that the activities [of the Municipality] had aspects
of an economic nature, they could only be ancillary”. Such statements raise
more questions than they actually solve.
Subsequent case law. Litigation was thus to be expected on the precise scope
of Henke. The cases of Mayeur (Full Court)54 and Collino (Sixth Chamber)55
confirm that while Henke is significant when purely administrative functions
are transferred, it does not apply to transfers of economic activities involving
a public authority.
Mr Mayeur was employed by a non-profit-making association – the APIM
– that promoted the City of Metz. To that end, the APIM published and
distributed a magazine, for which Mr Mayeur collected funds. Following the
transfer of the activity of the APIM to the City of Metz, Mr Mayeur was
dismissed. The question arose as to whether the Directive should cover such
a transfer to a public administrative body.
Under French law, only employees of undertakings transferred to public
institutions of an industrial or commercial nature are covered by the provisions
of the Directive. In Mayeur, the French Government argued that, although it
was an association subject to the rules of private law, the APIM was in reality
a public service entrusted with a task in the general interest. Consequently,
the taking-over of its activity by the City of Metz should be viewed as a
reorganization of the structures of public administration falling within the
scope of Henke.
The Court rejected this argument and distinguished Mayeur from Henke.
There are three stages in its reasoning. Firstly, the Court confirmed that the
Directive could apply to public and private entities, regardless of the legal
status of the entity or the manner in which it is funded. The Court took the
view that Henke only excluded the reorganization of structures of the public
administration or the transfer of administrative functions between public
administrative authorities. Consequently,
“[the Directive does not] permit the transfer of an economic activity from
a legal person governed by private law to a legal person governed by
public law to be excluded from the scope of the Directive solely on the
ground that the person to whom the activity is transferred is a public-law
body”.
To hold otherwise would frustrate the objectives of the Directive that the
continuity of employment relations is ensured. Secondly, the Court held that
Mayeur did not entail the reorganization of structures of the public admin-
istration but the transfer of an economic activity between two distinct legal
entities. Indeed, the APIM carried out publicity and information activities on
54. Case C-175/99, Mayeur, [2000] ECR I-7755.
55. Case C-343/98, Collino, [2000] ECR I-6659.
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behalf of the City of Metz, which means that it provided “services that are
economic in nature and cannot be regarded as deriving from the exercise of
public authority”. The Directive was thus applicable in Mayeur. However, the
Court noted in the third stage of its reasoning that it was for the referring court
to decide whether the entity in question had retained its identity and whether
the Directive actually applied to the facts of the case. This is the decisive test:
an entity cannot, as stated above, be reduced to the activity entrusted to it.
In the case of Collino, a telecommunications services operation managed
by a public body – the ASST – was transferred to the private company Tele-
com Italia. Under Italian law, this transfer derogated from the general rules
on transfers of undertakings. However, Mr Collino and Ms Chiappero, who
were employed by the ASST, claimed that Telecom Italia should have taken
them on under the same terms and conditions as they previously enjoyed. By
contrast, Telecom Italia argued that no transfer of an undertaking had taken
place, firstly, because a public body such as the ASST did not constitute an
undertaking and, secondly, because the exercise of the activity in question
was subject to the grant of an administrative concession. The question there-
fore arose as to whether the Italian legislation at stake was compatible with
Community law.
The Court quoted Henke and reasoned a contrario: the fact that the service
transferred is the subject of a concession by a public body cannot as such
exclude the application of the Directive, insofar as the activity concerned
amounts to a business activity rather than the exercise of public authority.
Subsequently, the Court relied on some of its competition law cases and
applied them by analogy to the facts of the case at hand: the management of
public telecommunications equipment and the placing of such equipment at
the disposal of users on payment of a fee amount to a business activity, not
to the exercise of public authority.56 Collino and Henke should consequently
be distinguished, the Directive being inapplicable in the latter case only.
Nevertheless, once again, the Court did not conclude on the facts of the case
as to whether the Directive should actually apply. Instead, it insisted that it
could only be relied upon by persons who were protected as employees under
national labour law. However, the case-file in Collino seemed to suggest that
the ASST’s employees were subject to a public-law status and thus could not
benefit from Italian labour law.57
56. Case 41/83, Italy v. Commission, [1985] ECR 873; Joined Cases C-271/90, C-281/90
& C-289/90, Spain and Others v. Commission, [1992] ECR I-5833.
57. See above for further discussion on the lack of a Community-wide definition of the term
“employee”.
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After Mayeur and Collino, it seems likely that few transfers will fall within
the scope of the Henke exclusion.58 However, these judgments do not con-
stitute a real change in the interpretation of the Court, they rather confirm
it; and doubts remain. Indeed, the Court still has to deal with several of the
points that the Advocate General raised in Henke. In particular, there are some
borderline areas and it may be difficult to distinguish an economic activity
from the exercise of public powers. However, on the basis of the Court’s case
law, this difference is crucial for the employees concerned by a transfer.
3.2.2. Insolvency situations and the Directive
The Court has also been given the opportunity since 1998 to refine its case
law on the relationship between the law of insolvency and the law on transfers
of undertakings.
3.2.2.1. The case law before 1998
In Abels59 the Court held that the application of the Directive to insolvency
situations could entail a serious risk of general deterioration in working and
living conditions of workers contrary to the objective of the Directive.60
Extending the scope of the Directive to insolvency proceedings may thus
be counterproductive in dissuading a potential transferee from acquiring an
undertaking on conditions acceptable to its creditors, who would then have
to sell the assets of the undertaking separately. That would lead to the loss of
all the jobs in the undertaking, detracting from the Directive’s effectiveness.
On the other hand, it is difficult to define this risk of general deterioration
more specifically as there are major differences of opinion with regard to the
exact consequences for the protection of employees of applying the Directive
to insolvency proceedings. Thus, the Court has held that Member States
could apply the provisions of the Directive to a transfer arising in insolvency
situations if they wished to do so. Moreover, the Court has refused to exclude
pre-insolvency proceedings from the scope of the Directive and has introduced
a distinction between different kinds of proceedings.61 It is necessary to
consider the purpose of the proceedings as the determining factor. If their aim
is to continue trading, then the Directive should apply, as the risk of general
58. This interpretation of the scope of Henke is in line with the view expressed by the UK
Government that the exclusion must be very limited. In the Cabinet Guidance of January 2001
“Staff Transfers in the Public Sector”, there is indeed a general assumption that the Directive
will apply and a policy statement that public authorities should behave as though it applies,
even where there is doubt.
59. Case 135/83, Abels, [1985] ECR 469.
60. Davies, “Acquired rights, creditors’ rights, freedom of contract, and industrial demo-
cracy”, 9 YEL (1989) 21.
61. Abels, cites supra note 59; Case C-362/89, D’Urso, [1991] ECR I-4105; Case C-472/93,
Spano, [1995] ECR I-4321.
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deterioration in working and living conditions of workers does not exist to a
large extent.
3.2.2.2. The refinement of the Court’s case law
The Court refined its case law further in two 1998 cases, De´thier and
Europie`ces. In De´thier62 Mr Dassy was employed by Sovam SPRL, which
was wound up by decree of the court. The liquidator dismissed Mr Dassy
and subsequently transferred to Jules De´thier Equipement SA the assets of
Sovam SPRL under an agreement approved by the court. The Cour du Trav-
ail de Lie`ge asked the Court whether the Directive applied. The Court held
that the distinction drawn in D’Urso63 could not simply be transposed to the
facts of De´thier: while in D’Urso the business was continued with a view
to reconstruction, in this case trading was being continued solely with the
aim of dissolving the company. The continuation of trade can therefore have
different aims that should be taken into account when assessing whether a
specific procedure falls within the scope of the Directive. That is why it may
not always be appropriate to rely solely on whether or not the undertaking
continues trading. The Court relied on its previous case law and held that
“in this case, since the criterion relating to the purpose of the procedure for
winding up by the court appears not to be conclusive, it is necessary to con-
sider the procedure in detail”. The Court emphasized that the liquidator was
an organ of the company who sold the assets under the supervision of the
general meeting. Moreover, it noticed that there was no special procedure for
establishing liabilities under the supervision of the court. Finally, it pointed
out that a creditor could enforce his debt and obtain judgment against the
company. By contrast, in the case of insolvency, the administrator is not an
organ of the company and he works exclusively under the supervision of the
court. Furthermore, the liabilities of the company are established in accord-
ance with a special procedure and a creditor could not enforce his claim
individually. The Court thus concluded that the procedure under which an
undertaking continues to trade while being wound up by the Court is not an
insolvency procedure and therefore falls within the scope of the Directive.
In Europie`ces64 the Court applied the same reasoning to a voluntary pro-
cedure, noting that “the reasons which led the Court to hold in De´thier that
the Directive can apply to transfers that occur while an undertaking is being
wound up by the Court are all the more pertinent where the undertaking
transferred is being wound up voluntarily”.
This distinction between insolvency and pre-insolvency proceedings has
been criticized. In particular, Paul Davies noted that if many companies
62. Case C-319/94, De´thier, [1998] ECR I-1061.
63. Cited supra note 61.
64. Case C-399/96, Europie`ces, [1998] ECR I-6965.
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opt for pre-insolvency procedures rather than insolvency procedures, this is
because they are more likely to sell off part of their business as a going
concern, thus securing some of the jobs involved. And this is precisely what
prompted the Court in Abels to exclude insolvent companies from the scope of
the Directive.65 In this respect, the distinction as it currently stands is difficult
to sustain.
3.2.2.3. The amendment of the Directive
The Directive was nonetheless amended in 1998 to incorporate this distinc-
tion. New Article 5(1) provides that “Articles 3 and 4 of the Directive shall not
apply to any transfer of an undertaking. . . where the transferor is the subject
of bankruptcy proceedings or any analogous insolvency proceedings which
have been instituted with a view to the liquidation of the assets of the transfer-
or and are under the supervision of a competent public authority (which may
be an insolvency practitioner authorized by a competent public authority)”.
Nevertheless, the Directive is particularly flexible in this respect insofar as
it expressly allows Member States to derogate from Article 5(1) if they wish
to apply the Directive to all insolvency situations.66 If they decide to do so,
however, Article 5(2) allows them to derogate from some provisions of the
Directive. In particular, they may limit the protection afforded by the Dir-
ective where the transferee or transferor and employee representatives “may
agree alterations, in so far as current law or practice permits, to the employ-
ees’ terms and conditions of employment designed to safeguard employment
opportunities by ensuring the survival of the undertaking. . . ” or “where the
transferor is in a situation of serious economic crisis, as defined by national
law”.
This intervention of the legislature to codify – once again – the case law
of the Court in the Directive, while at the same time allowing Member States
to derogate from its provisions, shows the tensions and the uncertainties sur-
rounding the consequences of insolvency or similar situations on the viability
of an undertaking. The aim is certainly to protect employees’ rights on trans-
fers. However, there is considerable scope for debate as to how this may be
best achieved in insolvency situations. The Court and the legislature are still
struggling to strike the proper balance.
65. Davies, op. cit. (1989) supra note 60.
66. Implementation of the Court’s case law. E.g. Abels, cited supra note 59.
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4. The rights protected under the Directive and the remedies available
for its breach
The Directive grants three kinds of rights to the employees covered by the
Directive:
– employment contracts or employment relationships are transferred auto-
matically with the same terms and conditions (Art. 3);
– dismissals by reason of the transfer alone are prohibited (Art. 4);
– employees representatives have the right to be informed and consulted on a
transfer (Art. 7).
During the period under scrutiny, the Court dealt exclusively with the
individual rather than with the collective rights protected under the Directive.
However, the Community legislature has amended the Directive in relation to
the latter.
4.1. Collective rights protected under the Directive
New Article 7(1) provides that the transferor and the transferee must inform
employee representatives of the date (or proposed date) of the transfer, the
reason for the transfer, the implications of the transfer for the employers and
any measures envisaged in relation to the employees. This information must
be provided “in good time”. Moreover, New Article 7(2) states that “where the
transferor or the transferee envisages measures in relation to his employees,
he shall consult the representatives of the employees in good time on such
measures with a view to reaching an agreement”. It is notable that the wording
of this clause has been changed from “with a view to seeking an agreement”
to “with a view to reaching an agreement”. This change may indicate that
the employer has a duty to take the proposals of employee representatives
into further consideration. Finally, under New Article 7(4), the obligation to
inform or consult employee representatives of a transfer of an undertaking
applies “irrespective of whether the actual decision to transfer the undertaking
was taken by the employer or an undertaking controlling the employer”.
New Article 7(5) is another example of the flexibility allowed by the Dir-
ective: Member States may limit the obligation laid down in paragraphs 1
and 2 to undertakings which, in terms of number of employees, “meet the
conditions for the election or nomination of a collegiate body representing
the employees”.
Where there are no employee representatives, the obligation to inform is
enhanced. Indeed, New Article 7(6) states that in such cases the relevant
employer must inform all the affected employees in advance of the same
information which would otherwise be given to employee representatives.
One may wonder why in this Article the term “in advance” is used, whereas
546 Garde CML Rev. 2002
Article 7(1) uses “in good time”. This is even more surprising as New Article
7(6) makes it a condition that the absence of employee representatives should
be through no fault of the employees in the undertaking. But how long
“in advance” should the affected employees be provided with the requisite
information?
4.2. Individual rights protected under the Directive
4.2.1. The Commission’s proposals for reform
Some changes were put forward by the Commission but failed to materialize.
In particular, the Commission suggested that the transferor and the transferee
should be jointly liable in respect of obligations arising before the transfer.
Unfortunately, this suggestion did not go through: Member States may provide
for joint liability but they do not have to do so. Such a change would have been
beneficial to employees, for it would have avoided the confusion regarding
which employer they should sue for a breach of the Directive. This would
have enhanced their protection, especially in the case of insolvency of an
employer, and would have thus been consistent with the assertion that the
main purpose of the Directive is to protect employees’ rights on transfers. On
the other hand, the failure of this reform is not really surprising, as Article 94
(ex 100) EC, requiring unanimity, remains the legal basis of the Directive.
4.2.2. Case law of the Court
The case law of the Court since 1998 on the rights protected by the Directive
has not given rise to particularly new issues. In Europie`ces and in Temco, the
Court has reiterated its previous case law on the right for employees to object
to their transfer.67 However, it is worth discussing the issue of remedies that
should be made available for a breach of Articles 3 and 4 of the Directive,
even if the Court has not yet been called upon to consider the issue directly,
as it has given rise to controversies in Member States.
4.2.3. The Directive and unfair dismissals
4.2.3.1. The case of De´thier
In De´thier68 the Tribunal du Travail de Lie`ge asked the Court whether the
defence available to employers in case of economic, technical and organiza-
tional reason entailing changes in the workforce (the ETO reason) could apply
67. Europie`ces, cited supra note 63 and Temco, cited supra note 28. On the right of employ-
ees to object to their transfer, see in particular Joined Cases C-132/91, 138/91 & 139/91,
Katsikas v. Konstantinidis, [1992] ECR I-6577, commented on by De Groot, op. cit. (1998)
supra note 3.
68. De´thier, supra note 62.
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both to dismissals effected by the transferor before the transfer as well as to
dismissals effected by the transferee after the transfer. The uncertainty origin-
ated in the wording of Article 4(1) of the Directive. As the Advocate General
emphasized, the first sentence of Article 4(1) – which prohibits dismissals on
ground of the transfer alone – applies to both the transferor and the transferee,
whereas the second sentence – which permits dismissals for an ETO reason
– does not indicate whether that right is conferred on the transferor, on the
transferee or on both. The Court held that the power to dismiss employees for
an ETO reason belongs to the transferor and to the transferee alike.69 This
outcome is logical. If both the transferor and the transferee are prevented in
principle from dismissing their employees on a transfer of an undertaking, it
is fair that they can both benefit from the exception to the rule.
The subsequent statement of the Court in De´thier is more controversial:
“employees unlawfully dismissed shortly before the undertaking is transferred
and not taken on by the transferee may claim, as against the transferee, that
their dismissal was unlawful” (emphasis added). This statement could be seen
– and has been by some70 – as giving a hint about the remedies that should
be available in national legal systems for a breach of Articles 3 and 4 of the
Directive.
This statement is not sufficient on its own to dispose of the issue of remedies.
Indeed, the Court was not directly called upon in De´thier to rule on this issue.
However, in the light of the controversies that it has already raised in some
Member States, it is likely (and hoped) that the Court will be given a more
straightforward opportunity to do so in the near future.
The Directive states in Article 4 that “the transfer of an undertaking, busi-
ness or part of a business shall not in itself constitute grounds for dismissal by
the transferor or the transferee”. Furthermore, Article 9 provides that “Mem-
ber States shall introduce in their national legal systems such measures as are
necessary to enable all employees and representatives of employees who con-
sider themselves wronged by failure to comply with the obligations arising
from this Directive to pursue their claims by judicial process after possible
recourse to other competent authorities”. What should consequently be the
remedies available to employees? If the transfer is automatic, dismissals are
“unlawful”, as the Court held in De´thier. But what should “unlawful” entail
in this context? Should it mean that the employee should keep his employ-
ment? Would compensation be an effective remedy? And if so, at what level?
Articles 4 and 9 alone do not provide answers to these questions.
69. The Court relied on Case C-101/87, Bork, [1988] ECR 3057.
70. See in particular the English Court of Appeal in Wilson and Baxendale, [1997] IRLR
505. See also Cavalier, Transfer Rights: TUPE in Perspective (The Institute of Employment
Rights, 1997), at p. 64.
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4.2.3.2. The case of Commission v. UK
The only direct opportunity the Court has had so far to deal with remedies for a
breach of the Directive arose in the case of Commission v. UK.71 However, the
question referred on this point concerned the failure of the United Kingdom
to provide for effective sanctions in case of a failure to inform and consult
workers’ representatives rather than the remedies for a breach of Articles 3
and 4 of the Directive.
In this case, the Court relied on its general case law and held that when the
Community
“does not provide any specific penalty in case of breach but refers on
this matter to national provisions, the Member States retain discretion
as to the choice of penalties. However, under Article [10 (ex 5)] of the
Treaty, which requires Member States to take all measures necessary
to guarantee the application and effectiveness of Community law, they
must ensure that infringements of a Community regulation are penalized
under conditions, both procedural and substantive, which are analogous
to those applicable to infringements of national law of a similar nature
and importance and which, in any event, make the penalty effective,
proportionate and dissuasive”.
The Court thus reaffirmed that the principle of procedural autonomy is subject
to two qualifications: firstly, that individuals should not be discriminated
against according to whether their claim is based on national or Community
law, and secondly that the remedies provided by national law must be effective.
4.2.3.3. The case law of the Court on sex equality
The case law of the Court in matters of sex equality illustrates the extent to
which the Court is ready to intervene to ensure that remedies are effective so
that individuals can exercise their Community rights. Useful analogies can be
drawn with transfer cases.
The Court ruled in Von Colson72 that the effectiveness principle was two-
fold: firstly, the remedies granted under national law must be such as to
compensate adequately the individual who has suffered a loss (the employ-
ee); secondly, the remedies must be such as to have a deterrent effect on the
party in breach of their obligations (the employer). The Court went one step
further in Marshall II.73 The main question was whether a limit on recoverable
damages – which were not purely nominal, as was the case in Von Colson –
violated the principle of effectiveness of Community law. The Court held that
71. Case C-382/92, Commission v. UK, [1994] ECR I-2435. See De Groot, op. cit. (1997)
supra note 3.
72. Case C-14/83, Von Colson, [1984] ECR 1891.
73. Case C-271/91, Marshall II, [1993] ECR I-4367.
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it was contrary to Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive74 for national
provisions to lay down an upper limit (which seems to mean any limit) on
the amount of compensation recoverable by a victim of discrimination in
respect of the loss and damage sustained. The Court held that real equality of
opportunity could not be attained in the absence of measures appropriate to
restore such equality when it has not been observed, since it limits the amount
of compensation a priori to a level which is not necessarily consistent with
the requirement of ensuring real equality of opportunity through adequate
reparation for the loss and damage sustained as a result of discriminatory
dismissal. The upper limit therefore had to be set aside.
Interestingly, Advocate General Van Gerven reached the same result on the
facts of the case, but the Court did not uphold his reasoning in its entirety.
Indeed, the Advocate General said:
“the fact that the compensation should in any event be ‘adequate in relation
to the damage sustained’ must however mean, in my view, also that the
Court . . . is prepared to accept less than compensation for the full damage
sustained. In other words, the compensation must be adequate in relation
to the damages sustained but does not have to be equal thereto. . . To lay
down upper limits on compensation is, as Community law stands, not
unlawful. However, the precondition is that the limit should be pitched
high enough in order to deprive the sanction of its ‘effective, uniform and
deterrent’ nature and does not prevent its being ‘adequate in relation to
the damage’ normally sustained as a result of an infringement”.
It seems that the Court went further by prohibiting upper limits on the amount
of recoverable compensation as such. On the other hand, the Court agreed
with the Advocate General that a Member State is free to provide the remedy
it prefers.
4.2.3.4. The analogy in transfer cases
The Court’s reasoning in Marshall could be transposed to transfer cases,
all the more so as Article 9 of the Directive is worded in the same way as
Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive. It seems that, in the present state
of Community law, Member States are free to decide whether an employee
unlawfully dismissed should be reinstated in his previous job, re-engaged
in another job or compensated for the loss he suffered as a result of his
employer’s breach of the Directive.75 However, Marshall seems to suggest
that there should be no upper limit on the amount of damages recoverable. It
is submitted that the law of unfair dismissal as it currently stands in the United
74. Directive 76/207, O.J. 1976, L 39/40.
75. Such has been the view expressed by Lord Slynn, both as an A.G. in Wendelboe, supra
note 16, and as a Law Lord in Meade and Baxendale, [1998] 4 All ER 609.
550 Garde CML Rev. 2002
Kingdom could be challenged on this basis. Indeed, the Employment Rights
Act76 sets an upper limit on the damages recoverable for unfair dismissal. It is
true that the amount of the compensatory award has recently been increased
to £ 51,700.77 Nevertheless, even in the unlikely event that upper limits could
still be sustained after Marshall, such a limit may not always be adequate
compensation. This is especially true in view of the fact that an employee
who is unfairly dismissed loses not only his job and his salary but also the
continuity of employment required to claim unfair dismissal against his future
employer.78 It was suggested in the Fairness at Work White Paper that the
upper limit to the compensatory award should be abolished.79 This would
be in line with the amendment of the main anti-discrimination statutes80 and
would enable individuals to be fully compensated for their losses.81
5. Conclusion
The Court still has to answer several questions concerning the interpretation of
the Directive. Two cases brought under Article 234 EC are currently pending
before the Court, but they will not address all the issues mentioned in this
article.82 The Directive is of partial and minimum harmonization only. This
gives an important degree of flexibility to Member States but also leaves
important gaps in the protection of employees’ rights on the transfer of an
undertaking. The controversies surrounding this dynamic area of the law are
clearly illustrated by the tensions in the Court’s case law and their acceptance
by the Community legislature. The question of the extent to which this area
can, and should, be further harmonized at Community level still remains to
be answered.
76. ERA 1996, ss. 112–132 on the remedies available for unfair dismissal.
77. ERA 1996, s. 124(1) as amended by SI 2000/21.
78. At least one year of continuous employment is required before being able to benefit
from the protection of the law on unfair dismissals. It used to be two years until the amendment
of section 108(1) of the ERA 1996 by SI 1999/1436.
79. Fairness at Work, 1998, CM 3968, para 3.5. See Deakin and Morris, Labour Law
(Butterworths, 2001), at p. 494.
80. Sex Discrimination Act 1975 as amended following Marshall II by SI 1993/2798; Race
Relations (Remedies) Act 1995; Disability Discrimination Act 1995.
81. Sir John Donaldson P once said that the aim of the compensatory award was “to
compensate, and to compensate fully.” (Norton Tool Co Ltd v. Tewson [1972] ICR 501).
82. Case C-164/00, Beckman; Case C-340/01, Abler and Others. Moreover, the Commission
has threatened to start proceedings against Italy for the defective implementation of Directive
98/50.
